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CHAPTER 1. ABSTRACT 
Since the challenge and competition within pharmaceutical company is constantly 
raising, it motivates pharmaceutical companies to take on different strategies to keep 
competitive and improve their company values. Common strategies taken by research 
pharmaceutical companies are M&A, Partnerships, and continuous R&D. This paper 
discovered using event study and OLS that the above three strategies do not lead to 
significant effects for research pharmaceutical companies when focus percentage on 
core research area is not considered. When core research area overlap is considered, this 
paper discovered that M&A, Partnership and R&D can manage to impose significantly 
positive effects onto research pharmaceutical companies once certain focus percentage 
is met.  The threshold of focus percentage, which can also be known as the turning 
point of M&A is the lowest, and for Partnership is the highest. Thus, Partnership deals 
need to implement a more focused strategy than M&A deals and R&D activities to 




CHAPTER 2. INTRODUCTION 
Recent years, since pharmaceutical industry, especially research pharmaceutical 
companies (here refers to those pharmaceutical companies that take the full process 
from research and develop new drugs to sale new drugs to the market) face various 
challenges, such as high R&D expenses and short life of patent. Because of those 
challenges, research pharmaceutical companies are urgent to take on new strategies to 
improve their profit and lower their cost. M&A deals and partnership agreements are 
common strategies research pharmaceutical companies take to  either gain more 
knowledge on their core researching areas or to obtain more pipelines. However, 
previous research often reveals that M&A deals cannot improve a company’s value, but 
rather reduce a company’s value. At the same time, there lacks previous research on the 
topic that whether or not partnerships can improve a company’s value. Therefore, this 
paper aims to research on whether or not M&A deals and partnerships can contribute to 
a company’s value positively. In addition, besides M&A deals and partnerships, the 
value of R&D, how focus the core research area of a research pharmaceutical company 
is, and the percentage of biopharmaceutical can also have an impact on a research 
pharmaceutical company. Thus, this paper also plans to incorporate those elements into 
consideration when examine how a research pharmaceutical company can achieve a 
higher corporation value through different strategies.  
 
This paper first examines the effect of M&A deals using event study. The result shows 
that most M&A deals do not impose significant effects on a research pharmaceutical 
company’s value. Based on this discovery, this paper then proceeds to examine effects 
of M&A deals using OLS with a broader sample size. This time, along with M&A deals, 
partnership deals, R&D value, core research area percentage and biopharmaceutical 
percentage are also incorporated. The result of this OLS model is similar to the result of 
event study. M&A deals do not have significant effects on research pharmaceutical 
company’s value. Moreover, core research area percentage appears to be the only 
element that has significant effect on company value. Observing those results, this paper 
decides to expand on partnership. Partnership is further broken down to partnership 
deals entered for obtaining product, technology, both, or purposes other than product 
and technology acquisition. The result again shows no significant effect on company 
value. Since core research area percentage constantly appears as the only variable that 
can have a significantly positive effect on research pharmaceutical company value, it 
leads to a hypothesis that M&A deals, Partnership deals and R&D activities that focus 
on core research area can boost up the value of a research pharmaceutical company can 
generate significant positive results for company value. Findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis. Moreover, M&A deals that have a core research percentage more than 48% 
can turn a significant negative effect to a significant positive effect.  
 
This paper is composed by 8 parts. The first part will introduce the background that 
leads this paper to research on how a research pharmaceutical company can improve its 
value. The second part consists literature review giving previous researches that serve as 
base of this paper. The third part discusses about methods used to examine and research 
on how can a research pharmaceutical company achieve a higher company value. The 
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fourth and fifth part discuss about the result and the implied meaning of the result. The 
sixth part states some of the limits this paper has and potential future research areas. The 




CHAPTER 3. BACKGROUND 
While pharmaceutical industry is seen as one of the most profitable industries by 
manufacturing and selling drugs to the market, companies within this industry still faces 
numerous challenges. Those challenges motive pharmaceutical companies to take on 
different strategies to keep and expand the market share, to remain competitive, and 
most importantly, to improve their corporate values. To better understand challenges 
pharmaceutical companies are facing, two representative challenges will be discussed.  
Section 1. HIGH R&D EXPENSE 
To research and develop a drug, the process is long and complicated. It has to go 
through the pre-clinical trial and clinical trial(Taylor 2016). During the pre-clinical trial, 
the company firstly needs to research into a particular illness or disease. Only when a 
target within people’s body is found after the research on illness or disease, the 
company can proceed to develop a drug. The company then needs to search for a 
substance that can have an effect on the target from chemical libraries. Once substances 
are found, a further selection process is necessary to find the potentially most effective 
substances, as well as modify the substance for a better result and to reach a more 
suitable form (for example, tablet is a common form for patients to take in a regularly 
basis) for patients to take. When move on to the clinical trial, the company needs to 
verify the drug is effective on human being’s body. The fact is that the result does not 
always turn to be appealing. Moreover, the drug can be effective to a particular group of 
people, and not effective to another group of people. In all steps discussed above, cost is 
incurred. And in any steps discussed above, the drug can be discovered as “no 
commercial value” and be terminated. The cost will then be incurred for no benefits. 
In addition, it is usual that more than 10 years have past from the time a company finds 
a particular substance have effect on a particular target to the time the drug is ready to 
release (Taylor 2016). The long life cycle can lead to a resource dispersion, which either 
limit the ability to research on other areas or require the company to contribute more 
capital to the R&D department. Furthermore, since it is almost impossible to predict 
whether or not a new discovery can potentially be released as a drug and bring profit to 
a pharmaceutical company, pharmaceutical companies constantly bear the risk of 
investment on a no return project.  
Thus, although pharmaceutical industry seems to be one of the most profitable 
industries, pharmaceutical companies that go through the whole cycle of research and 
development, manufacture, marketing, and distribution  bears extremely high up front 
cost and extremely high risk of no profit generation.  
 
Section 2. SHORT LIFE OF PATENT 
Once a drug is developed after the whole process of R&D and released to the market, 
the drug will be under the protection of patent. Under the protection of patent, the 
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research pharmaceutical company has the exclusive right to manufacture and sale the 
drug to the market. During this protection period, research pharmaceutical companies 
have the chance to generate revenue to recover their R&D cost and make a profit.  
 
However, two problems exist with the concept of patent protection. Firstly, generic 
pharmaceutical companies can compete with research pharmaceutical companies for 
market share when patent expired. Pharmaceutical industry, often known as the industry 
manufactures and sales drugs to the market, and is often associated with big name firms 
such as Pfizer, Merck, and Novartis. Although those research pharmaceutical companies 
make up 40% of the market share, they are a small portion of the whole industry. About 
90% of the pharmaceutical industry makes up by generic companies (Taylor 2016). 
Generic companies are those companies that do not perform research and development, 
but manufacture and distribute drugs using concept and principle with expired patent. 
As discussed above, the concept and principle is protected by patent only for about 10 
years. Once the patent is expired, generic companies can make a profit by two ways: 
they can manufacture using the concept and principle without protection of patent and 
sale to the market, or they can enter into an agreement with research pharmaceutical 
companies to get paid by pharmaceutical companies to  delay their manufacture and 
selling behavior. It is clear that the profit made by generic companies are at the cost of 
research pharmaceutical companies. If the generic company manufactures and sales 
drug to the market at a lower price, market share of research pharmaceutical companies 
will be reduced. To avoid this market share dispersion, research pharmaceutical 
companies may choose to pay for generic companies to delay the manufacture and 
selling behavior. The amount of cost might be lower than the loss of market share, but 
cost is a cost.  
 
Secondly, concepts and principles of drugs are not secrets any more once it is 
announced. Thus, even other research pharmaceutical companies can benefit from the 
expiration of patents. Other pharmaceutical companies can research on the same area, 
manufacture and sale drugs with similar concepts and principles once the patent no long 
protects the exclusive usage. Therefore, the original research company needs to generate 
revenue as much as possible during the patent protection period. This is the reason why 
research pharmaceutical companies spend a huge amount of capital on marketing. 
Research pharmaceutical companies need to communicate to the market, to doctors, and 
to patients about the new drug because they have no time to wait for the information to 
gradually convey to the market.   
 
The above challenges lead to a current trend that pharmaceutical companies, especially 
huge research pharmaceutical companies (pharmaceutical companies that have high 
market shares and high market values) to engage in M&A and partnerships. Huge 
pharmaceutical companies hope to short the R&D time and cut down R&D cost by 
acquiring new technology or product through M&A deals or partnerships. This trend 




CHAPTER 4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Recent years, the effect from M&A to the acquiring and acquired companies has been a 
hot topic. There are many researchers try to analyze on whether or not M&A increase a 
firm's value after the execution of M&A. It might not be appropriate to evaluate a case 
of M&A without consideration of the purpose of M&A, because different strategies and 
purposes of M&A could produce different outcomes.  
  
Within pharmaceutical industry, there are two patterns when firms try to take the step of 
M&A. One is to acquire a pharmaceutical firm which researches on the same core 
therapeutic area as the acquiring firm to deepen the understanding of a company’s focus 
area; the other one is to acquire a firm which researches on different core therapeutic 
areas to expand pipelines. It is difficult to identify which one of the two patterns could 
provide a higher return to both the acquiring and acquired firms. However, some of the 
researchers find that, there exists a trade-off between core therapeutic areas and 
pipelines. That is to say, firms struggle to gain both deeper understanding of core 
therapeutic areas and more diversified pipelines. Pavlou found that, “increase pipeline 
productivity and innovation, support market expansion or sustainable profitability, and 
aid the transition towards full integration” (Pavlou 2003) are the main motivations of 
pharmaceutical companies to initiate the M&A journey. Within all M&A deals, deals 
happened between two fulling integrated deals make up almost half of the total value of 
deals. This is mostly because firms nowadays are seeking for consolidation and 
innovation. Both Morgan and Mazzucato discussed that growth rate is high when 
competition is high, and pharmaceutical industry relies heavily on innovation (Morgan 
2001; Mazzucato 2015). At the same time, pharmaceutical industry faces the difficulty 
that the size of R&D expenditures is often high, and the time a pipeline takes to reach 
the market is high. Therefore, the need and motivation for pharmaceutical companies to 
innovate and increase their pipelines are clear.  
  
Nonetheless, while some researchers found that M&A yield a negative impact on 
pharmaceutical companies, Koening and Elizabeth stated that “pharmaceutical 
companies that merged were able to achieve more favorable post-merger productivity 
scores than were obtained prior to their merger” (Koenig & Elizabeth 2004). The 
contradicting findings lead to the question that whether or not M&A can provide a 
positive impact to pharmaceutical companies and if possible, how.  
 
When combine the discussion above, the question now becomes, is pursuing deeper 
understanding of core therapeutic area through M&A is more appropriate and profitable 
to pharmaceutical companies than pursuing more pipelines?  
  
The question also leads to another question that are any other factors other than M&A 
can yield a positive impact on a pharmaceutical company? If M&A does not at most 
time contribute positive effects to a pharmaceutical company, then what could and 




In this paper, four other factors besides M&A will also be examined. Those are 
Research & Development value, biopharmaceutical rate, focus percentage of a company 
in its main research area, and partnerships a company entered with other companies. As 
mentioned by Blazenko, while R&D is found to have the capability to recover initial 
cost and to respond to investors’ requirements since intellectual property is protected by 
regulations and dominant market share is sometimes possible through R&D, (Blazenko 
& Pavlov 2010), financial measures used in that paper did not capture R&D 
contribution to future profitability. This finding leads to the question that whether or not 
R&D positively contribute to pharmaceutical companies’ value. This question is 
especially important to research pharmaceutical companies since R&D is one of the 
most important activities they take on a daily basis. At the same time, there lack 
researches on how biopharmaceutical, main area focus percentage and partnership can 
affect a pharmaceutical company’s value. However, as discussed above, these factors 
are also determinate when pharmaceutical companies seek to obtain more competitive 
technology and products. Therefore, these three factors are also included in this paper 
aiming to find out what would be the effects.  
 
In conclusion, the purpose of this paper is to identify which strategies taken by 
pharmaceutical companies have the potential or the ability to increase the values of 
those companies. Beyond this, if there is no current strategy that improves the values of 
pharmaceutical companies, what would be a potential strategy that can help to improve 




CHAPTER 5. METHODOLOGY 
To analyze whether M&A can provide a positive impact to pharmaceutical companies, 
two hypothesis and methodologies are sequentially tested and utilized. Following M&A, 
R&D, the effect of biopharmaceutical rate and focus percentage, and partnership is also 
tested.   
 
To quantify the value of a pharmaceutical company, Tobin’s q is used. Tobin’s q is 
defined as  
 
Tobin’s Q=  
 
As M&A, R&D, partnership, biopharmaceutical rate and focus percentage affects both 
market value and asset value of a pharmaceutical company, Tobin’s q is a proper 
measure to quantify both values at the same time.  
 
Section 1. HYPOTHESIS 1: M&A EVENTS IN GENERAL GENERATE POSITIVE 
RESULTS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES.  
Firstly, event study is utilized to examine whether M&A could help to improve Tobin’s 
Q of a pharmaceutical company. Hypothesis under this step is that M&A is capable to 
yield positive impacts on pharmaceutical companies.  
 
To construct a sample of events that will be tested under the event study, top 10 
pharmaceutical companies from the United States, Japan and Europe are used. 
Therefore, 30 pharmaceutical companies in total are selected. M&A events took place 
with those pharmaceutical companies during 2004 to 2018 would be the pool for 
potential event list that will be tested under event study. To form the final event list, 
length of the event window and estimation window should be decided. Event window is 
set at before and after 10 days, and the estimation window is set at 1 year. The event 
window set at before and after 10 days because investors respond to an event quickly to 
secure any potential benefits and to avoid any potential losses based on their perception. 
10 days as an event window is also normal across financial academic papers that used 
event studies. The estimation window is 1 year, because the 1-year window is both 
sufficient to illustrate a company’s current condition and short enough to erase out any 
noise that is relatively irrelevant to the company’s current condition. The 10-day and 
1-year combination can help to evaluate effects purely from M&A, and thus conclude 
on whether M&A could positively contribute to a pharmaceutical companies Tobin’s Q. 
When the event list is formed, any event that has an estimation window containing a 
M&A event performed by the same company will be dropped out from the list. This 
event study follows a total of four steps. The first step is to fit a model based on 
historical stock log returns to get an estimation model. To fit this model, Capital Asset 
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Pricing Model (CAPM) formed by William Sharpe (1964) and John Lintner (1965) is 
used.  
 
E(Ri ) = Rf  + βi(Ri −Rf) 
where E(Ri) is the expected return, Rf is the market risk free return, Ri is the stock return 
of a specific company, and the βi represents the risk of one specific pharmaceutical 
company.  
The model is fitted by using stock return and risk free return (the index return) to 
estimate  βi.  
 
The second step is to calculate the expected return during the event window from the 
fitted model using index data during the event window. The expected return is then 
estimated using the fitted model using observed index return as input variable.  
 
And then the third step is to compare the observed actual return to the calculated 
expected return to get abnormal return.  
 
AR = R - E(Ri )  
where AR is the abnormal return calculated by subtract E(Ri ) from R (observed 
return).  
 
The abnormal return is also summed up to get the cumulative abnormal return to 
illustrate M&A event effects at an aggregated level.  
 
CAV =  
where “ds” and “de” stands for the start and end of testing window of each market for 
each event.  
 
Finally, the abnormal return and the cumulative abnormal return are tested for 
significance using t-test to draw the conclusion on whether M&A events have an effect 
on companies’ Tobin’s Q. The null hypothesis of no impact can be expressed as:  
 
H0: CAAV = 0 
  
To expand on the event study, a simple linear regression is used to identify again 
whether or not M&A contributes positive results to a pharmaceutical company. This 
time, along with M&A, four other parameters are also included, which are R&D value, 
Partnership Value, biopharmaceutical percentage and research focus percentage.  
 
 = , 
where y is the Tobin’s q of each research pharmaceutical company, is the Percentage 
of log value of M&A deals in log value of asset,  is the percentage of  log value of 
R&D activities in log value of asset,  is the percentage of log value of Partnership 
deals in log value of asset,  is the biopharmaceutical percentage, and  is the 




The simple linear regression is used to identify two things. Firstly, does the result of 
simple linear regression consistent with the result of event study? That is to say, if event 
study shows that M&A leads to an increase of Tobin’s q, whether simple linear 
regression also reaches the conclusion that M&A positive effects on Tobin’s q. 
Secondly, how do other factors other than M&A contribute to Tobin’s q? Does there 
exist other factors that can increase Tobin’s q? To specify the definition of the other 
four variables: Biopharmaceutical rate is the ratio between pipelines that are using 
biopharmaceutical technology instead of chemical and all pipelines(including both 
under research and released); research focus percentage is the ratio between number of 
pipelines dealing with top 3 researching area and number of all pipelines; partnership is 
the percentage that partnership value amount of total assets; M&A deal value is the 
percentage that total deal log value among events took place within a year of total 
assets; R&D investment value is the percentage that total investment a company 
allocated to R&D during a year of assets. These variables are incorporated in the linear 
regression model to see if they can positively affect a company’s Tobin’s q and whether 
they affect Tobin’s q in a larger magnitude than M&A events.  
 
Section 2. HYPOTHESIS 2: DIFFERENT TYPES OF PARTNERSHIP AFFECT 
COMPANY’S TOBIN’S Q DIFFERENTLY. SOME MAY BE POSITIVE AND SOME MAY 
BE NEGATIVE, AND THE MAGNITUDES ARE DIFFERENT ACROSS DIFFERENT 
TYPES.  
Following the examination on effect of M&A, the effect of partnership is also examined 
using OLS. The hypothesis under this step is that aggregate partnership effects on 
Tobin’s q is positive, and certain types of partnership contribute more than other types. 
There are mainly four types of partnerships: product, technology, product and 
technology and miscellaneous. Product type includes those partnerships that aim to 
obtain the actual products; technology type includes those partnerships that aim to 
obtain only the technology; product and technology type aims to obtain both product 
and technology; miscellaneous type is all other partnerships that do not fall in to product, 
technology, or product and technology.  
This model will utilize OLS to test which type of partnership gives rise to the Tobin’s q 
the most. The variables of partnerships are the percentage of each type in the aggregated 
partnership value. Other variables that used in previous models also used in this model 
to see how partnership affects Tobin’s q along with all other factors.  
 
, 
where y is the Tobin’s q of research pharmaceutical company, is the percentage of 
log value of M&A deals in log value of asset,  is the percentage of  log value of 
R&D activities in log value of asset, is the percentage of log value of Partnership 
deals aim to earn product in log value of asset,  is the percentage of log value of 
Partnership deals aim to earn technology benefits in log value of asset,   is the 
percentage of log value of Partnership deals aim to earn both product and technology 
benefits in log value of asset,  is the the percentage of log value of Partnership deals 
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aim to earn miscellaneous benefits in log value of asset,  is the biopharmaceutical 
percentage, and is the focus percentage of research areas.  
 
At the same time, to further isolate the effect from company activities (here refers to 
M&A deals, Partnership deals, and R&D activities), a model dropped 
biopharmaceutical percentage variable and focus percentage. 
 
, 
where y is the Tobin’s q of research pharmaceutical company, is the percentage of 
log value of M&A deals in log value of asset, is the percentage of  log value of 
R&D activities in log value of asset,  is the percentage of log value of Partnership 
deals aim to earn product in log value of asset,  is the percentage of log value of 
Partnership deals aim to earn technology benefits in log value of asset,   is the 
percentage of log value of Partnership deals aim to earn both product and technology 
benefits in log value of asset,  is the percentage of log value of Partnership deals aim 
to earn miscellaneous benefits in log value of asset. 
 
Furthermore, to isolate effects from different types of Partnership deals, M&A deal 
value and R&D value are dropped as well.  
 
where y is the Tobin’s q of research pharmaceutical company, is the percentage of 
log value of Partnership deals aim to earn product in log value of asset,  is the 
percentage of log value of Partnership deals aim to earn technology benefits in log value 
of asset,  is the percentage of log value of Partnership deals aim to earn both product 
and technology benefits in log value of asset,  is the percentage of log value of 
Partnership deals aim to earn miscellaneous benefits in log value of asset. 
  
Section 3. HYPOTHESIS 3: M&A TOOK PLACE TO IMPROVE THE FOCUS 
RESEARCH AREA WILL CONTRIBUTE POSITIVE EFFECTS ON COMPANY’S TOBIN’S 
Q, AND R&D IN THE FOCUS RESEARCH AREA WILL CONTRIBUTE POSITIVE 
EFFECTS ON COMPANY’S TOBIN’S Q AS WELL.  
Finally, to more closely analyze the effect of focus percentage, the crossover between 
focus percentage and M&A value and focus percentage and R&D value are 
incorporated into the regression model. Since M&A, R&D and Partnership can increase 
focus percentage by acquiring a target that researches on the same area as acquirer, 
investing more resources to research on the main area of the company, or enter into a 
partnership to deeply understand the focus researching area, it is necessary to separately 
examine focus percentage rate on the basis of M&A, R&D and partnership.  
 
This model will again utilize OLS to test effects of crossover between focus percentage 
and M&A value, focus percentage and R&D value, and focus percentage and 
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partnership. Three separate regression models will be estimated with all other factors 
being the same for crossover between focus percentage and M&A value, focus 
percentage and R&D value, and focus percentage and partnership.  
 
 
where y is the Tobin’s q of research pharmaceutical company, is the percentage of 
log value of M&A deals in log value of asset,  is the crossover variable of log value 
of M&A deals in log value of asset and focus percentage of research areas,  is the 
log value of Partnership deals in log value of asset, and  is the log value of R&D in 
log value of asset. 
 
 
where y is the Tobin’s q of research pharmaceutical company, is the percentage of 
log value of M&A deals in log value of asset,  is the crossover variable of log value 
of R&D activities in log value of asset and focus percentage of research areas,  is the 
log value of Partnership deals in log value of asset, and  is the log value of R&D in 
log value of asset. 
 
 
where y is the Tobin’s q of research pharmaceutical company, is the percentage of 
log value of M&A deals in log value of asset,  is the crossover variable of log value 
of Partnership deals in log value of asset and focus percentage of research areas,  is 
the log value of Partnership deals in log value of asset, and  is the log value of R&D 
in log value of asset. 
 
 
where y is the Tobin’s q of research pharmaceutical company, is the log value of 
M&A deals in log value of asset,  is the crossover variable of log value of M&A 
deals in log value of asset and focus percentage of research areas, X is the control 
variable, and is the error term.  
 
 
where y is the Tobin’s q of research pharmaceutical company, is the log value of 
Partnership deals in log value of asset,  is the crossover variable of log value of 
Partnership deals in log value of asset and focus percentage of research areas, X is the 
control variable, and is the error term.  
 
 
where y is the Tobin’s q of research pharmaceutical company, is the log value of 
R&D activities in log value of asset,  is the crossover variable of log value of R&D 
activities in log value of asset and focus percentage of research areas, X is the control 
variable, and is the error term.  
 
For all linear squared models, data used is year-base. All variables are aggregated into a 
year unit. For example, R&D values is the total amount a company contributes to R&D 
within one year, and M&A value is the total value of all deals took place during one 
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year. When perform the regression, the percentages of assets are used. Total R&D value 
within one year of total asset is used to test the effects on R&D, and the same concept 
applies to M&A and all types of Partnerships. 
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Mean Median STD Min Max 
Tobin’s Q 1.560862069  1.33  0.860595793 0.38 5.1 
R&D 0.328941813 0.329949309 0.033457717 0.262433973 0.434640205 
M&A 0.328049605 0.343863883  0.06238266 0.151896844 0.434116203 
Partnership 0.225006411 0.259919223 0.106439237 0 1.024596057 
Miscellaneous 0.02681992   0 0.076054217 0 0.335023478 
Product 0.225006411  0.259919223 0.106439237 0 0.349078188 
P&T 0.070141586 0 0.108301001 0 0.315110557 
Technology 0.042622436  0 0.076271671 0 0.314889496 
BioRate 0.317547758 0.321168493  0.13140475 0.082441113 0.673469388 
Focus 0.515453114  0.480151829 0.094771817 0.41627907 0.73828125 
This table presents descriptive data of all variables used in this paper, including dependent variable and 
12 independent variables. Dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which is the Tobin’s Q of research 
pharmaceutical companies. Independent variables are R&D, M&A, Partnership, Miscellaneous, Product, 
P&T, Technology, BioRate, Focus, Focus x R&D, Focus x M&A, and Focus x Partnership. R&D is the 
percentage of  log value of R&D activities in log value of asset, M&A is the percentage of log value of 
M&A deals in log value of asset, Partnership is the percentage of log value of Partnership deals in log 
value of asset, Miscellaneous is the percentage of log value of Partnership deals aim to earn 
miscellaneous benefits in log value of asset, Product is the percentage of log value of Partnership deals 
aim to earn product in log value of asset, P&T is the percentage of log value of Partnership deals aim to 
earn both product and technology benefits in log value of asset, Technology is the percentage of log value 
of Partnership deals aim to earn technology benefits in log value of asset, BioRate is the 




Section 1. HYPOTHESIS 1: M&A EVENTS IN GENERAL GENERATE POSITIVE 
RESULTS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES. 
Section 2. HYPOTHESIS 2: DIFFERENT TYPES OF PARTNERSHIP AFFECT 
COMPANY’S TOBIN’S Q DIFFERENTLY. SOME MAY BE POSITIVE AND SOME MAY 
BE NEGATIVE, AND THE MAGNITUDES ARE DIFFERENT ACROSS DIFFERENT 
TYPES.  
Under the methodology of event study, 50 events happened in Europe, the United States 
and Japan are tested to see whether or not M&A generated positive results (meaning the 
result is non-zero and increased Tobin’s q of a pharmaceutical company). The result is 
evaluated in the level of individual daily abnormal return and individual cumulative 
abnormal return. The aim is to identify whether there exists a trend of significant results, 
and whether there exists positive significant cumulative effects from M&A deals.  
 
Based on the result (the result is presented in the Appendix), there is no consistent trend 
existing in the daily abnormal returns. Different events have different result trends. 
Some of the events yield significant result prior to the actual acquisition announcement, 
some of the events yield significant result after the actual acquisition announcement, 
and some of the events merely yield no significant results. Because daily abnormal 
return can also due to other factors besides M&A deals, for example, equity market 
volatility, and can be offset by later opposite direction abnormal returns, cumulative 
abnormal return also need to be considered and should be a more important result when 
evaluating the effects of M&A deals.  
 
The result of cumulative abnormal return for each event (the result is presented in 
Appendix), however, revealed that most of the events do not have significant 
cumulative abnormal return during before and after event period (6 out of 58 events 
yield significant cumulative abnormal returns).  
 
As stated above, most M&A deals are not found to have significant results on a research 
pharmaceutical company’s Tobin’s q. Since event study only tests the effect during the 
event window, long-term effects are not captured. It might be suitable to test the effect 
of M&A announcement, but might not be suitable to test the aggregate M&A effect on a 
research pharmaceutical company. That is to say, event study does not capture effects to 
the pharmaceutical company brought by pipeline diversification or improvement on 
current core research area obtained from M&A deals. Nonetheless, this paper aims to 
test whether or not M&A deals will bring significant positive effects to a research 
pharmaceutical company in a longer span. Thus, event study might not be the most 
suitable methodology under this context.  
 
Based on above reason, to further verify and examine the result of event study, a linear 
regression model is also used to examine the effect and significance of M&A deals. 
When total M&A deal value is used to identify whether or not M&A deals have positive 
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significant effects on pharmaceutical company’s Tobin’s q, the result is consistent with 
the result of event study that M&A deals do not have significant influence on 
company’s Tobin’s q. The same thing is discovered with R&D and Partnership. 
Variables that are discovered to have significant positive contribution is the focus 
percentage, which is the ratio between number of pipelines dealing with top 3 
researching area and number of all pipelines, and R&D which is the percentage of log 
value in total log asset.  
 
Since no significant results are found for all variables used other than focus percentage, 
the question that why do those variables have no significant effects and the question that 
how can those variables impose significant effects on a research pharmaceutical 
company. Thus, it leads this paper from the first hypothesis to the second hypothesis, 
different types of partnership affect company’s Tobin’s q differently, and some may be 
positive and some may be negative, and the magnitudes are different across different 
types.  
 
Although the effects from partnership did not appear to be significant when examined 
using OLS in preceding model, it could be due to the reason that different types of 
partnerships yield different effects, and some of the positive effects are offset by 
negative effects. That is to say, when examining different types of partnerships 
separately, certain types of partnership might appear to have significant effects on 
pharmaceutical company’s Tobin’s q.  When four types of partnerships are examined, 
unfortunately, the result of the model showed that none of the types have significant 
effects on pharmaceutical company’s Tobin’s q. The same results are found even when 
further isolate the effects from 4 types of Partnership deals by dropping 
biopharmaceutical percentage, focus percentage, log value of M&A deals and log value 
of R&D activities.  
 
As discovered in previous model examining hypothesis 1, variable focus percentage 
appears to be the only variable that can generate positive significant results to the 
pharmaceutical company’s Tobin’s q. This result suggests that pharmaceutical 
companies might achieve to increase their Tobin’s q only by deeply understanding and 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(Intercept) 0.6473  0.58667  1.8313*** 1.57420 
Partnership -0.4459  
   




M&A 0.4655 0.49935 
 
0.09909 
R&D -5.0833 *  -5.37765* 
 
0.73105   




-1.46018 -0.5700  -0.57301 
Product 
 
-0.04877  -1.0796 -1.13134 
Technology 
 
-1.48921    -1.6487  -1.64153 
P&T 
 
0.42553  0.5922  0.58416 
This table reports the result of Ordinary Linear Squared (OLS) model testing effects of M&A deals, R&D 
activities, Partnership deals (aggregate and 4 different types), biopharmaceutical percentage, and focus 
percentage of core research areas. *,**, and *** indicate significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%.  
 
Section 3. HYPOTHESIS 3: M&A TOOK PLACE TO IMPROVE THE FOCUS 
RESEARCH AREA WILL CONTRIBUTE POSITIVE EFFECTS ON COMPANY’S TOBIN’S 
Q, AND R&D IN THE FOCUS RESEARCH AREA WILL CONTRIBUTE POSITIVE 
EFFECTS ON COMPANY’S TOBIN’S Q AS WELL.  
As discovered when examining the hypothesis 1, the only variable appears to be 
significant is the focus variable. In addition, the focus variable steadily appears to have 
positive effects on the Tobin’s q of pharmaceutical companies. Since the focus variable 
represents the ratio between number of pipelines dealing with top 3 researching area and 
number of all pipelines, the focused pipeline may be obtained through in house R&D 
researches on core area, M&A deals that focus on core area of research, or entered in to 
partnerships to obtain more ability to achieve deeper research on the top researching 
areas. This discovery triggers a question that which of these channels contribute to the 
positive result of the focus variable.  
 
Therefore, the cross over variables of R&D and focus percentage, M&A and focus 
percentage, and partnership and focus percentage are incorporated into the OLS model 
to examine which of these variables generate positive significant results for 
pharmaceutical company’s Tobin’s q.  
 
The result is that, when incorporated pure R&D variable and crossover variable of R&D 
and focus percentage into the model at the same time, the crossover variable appears to 
have a positive significant effect while pure R&D variable appears to have a negative 
significant effect. The same thing also discovered with M&A and partnership. That is to 
say, the crossover variable of M&A and focus percentage appears to have a positive 
significant effect while pure M&A variable appears to have a negative significant effect, 
and the crossover variable of partnership and focus percentage appears to have a 
positive significant effect while pure partnership variable appears to have a negative 
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significant effect. Within magnitudes of three crossover variables (crossover variable of 
pure R&D and focus percentage, crossover variable of pure M&A and focus percentage, 
and crossover variable of pure partnership and focus percentage), the crossover variable 
incorporated R&D and M&A shows similar level of magnitude, which crossover 





(1) (2) (3) 
(Intercept) 2.5662** 0.044438 *  0.067519  
M&A 0.6579 0.026148 * 0.366310 




R&D -3.7581 0.535843 0.008592 ** 
Focus x R&D 
  
0.000304 *** 
Partnership -5.3171**  0.288293  0.277808 
Focus x Par 8.8460** 
  
BioRate 0.9230 0.286192  0.310484 
This table reports the result of Ordinary Linear Squared (OLS) model testing effects of M&A deals, R&D 
activities, Partnership deals , and biopharmaceutical percentage with the consideration of crossover effect 
with focus percentage of core research areas. *,**, and *** indicate significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
Dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which is the Tobin’s Q of research pharmaceutical companies. 
Independent variables are R&D, M&A, Partnership, Miscellaneous, Product, P&T, Technology, BioRate, 
Focus, Focus x R&D, Focus x M&A, and Focus x Partnership. R&D is the percentage of  log value of 
R&D activities in log value of asset, M&A is the percentage of log value of M&A deals in log value of 
asset, Partnership is the percentage of log value of Partnership deals in log value of asset, Miscellaneous 
is the percentage of log value of Partnership deals aim to earn miscellaneous benefits in log value of asset, 
Product is the percentage of log value of Partnership deals aim to earn product in log value of asset, P&T 
is the percentage of log value of Partnership deals aim to earn both product and technology benefits in log 
value of asset, Technology is the percentage of log value of Partnership deals aim to earn technology 
benefits in log value of asset, BioRate is the biopharmaceutical percentage, Focus is the core research 
area percentage, Focus x R&D is the crossover variable of the percentage of  log value of R&D activities 
in log value of asset and the core research area percentage, Focus x M&A  is the crossover variable of the 
percentage of  log value of M&A deals in log value of asset and the core research area percentage, and 
Focus x Partnership is  the crossover variable of the percentage of  log value of Partnership deals in log 
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Focus 1.2152* 1.4535*  1.8359***  1.6510 5.4388* 5.424 ** 
This table reports the result of Ordinary Linear Squared (OLS) model testing effects of M&A deals, R&D 
activities, Partnership deals , and biopharmaceutical percentage with the consideration of crossover effect 
with focus percentage of core research areas. *,**, and *** indicate significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
Dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which is the Tobin’s Q of research pharmaceutical companies. 
Independent variables are R&D, M&A, Partnership, Miscellaneous, Product, P&T, Technology, BioRate, 
Focus, Focus x R&D, Focus x M&A, and Focus x Partnership. R&D is the percentage of  log value of 
R&D activities in log value of asset, M&A is the percentage of log value of M&A deals in log value of 
asset, Partnership is the percentage of log value of Partnership deals in log value of asset, Miscellaneous 
is the percentage of log value of Partnership deals aim to earn miscellaneous benefits in log value of asset, 
Product is the percentage of log value of Partnership deals aim to earn product in log value of asset, P&T 
is the percentage of log value of Partnership deals aim to earn both product and technology benefits in log 
value of asset, Technology is the percentage of log value of Partnership deals aim to earn technology 
benefits in log value of asset, BioRate is the biopharmaceutical percentage, Focus is the core research 
area percentage, Focus x R&D is the crossover variable of the percentage of  log value of R&D activities 
in log value of asset and the core research area percentage, Focus x M&A  is the crossover variable of the 
percentage of  log value of M&A deals in log value of asset and the core research area percentage, and 
Focus x Partnership is  the crossover variable of the percentage of  log value of Partnership deals in log 
value of asset and the core research area percentage. Although the results of regression (4) presents no 







CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION 
M&A deals are not found as a contributor for research pharmaceutical company value’s 
improvement through event study and are not found when examine M&A deals using 
OLS without consideration of focused percentage, which is mostly consistent with 
previous research. Additionally, similar to M&A deals, Partnership deals and R&D are 
not found to be advantageous when focused percentages are not taken into consideration. 
However, it does not mean that those are useless tools. 
 
As the result shows that focused M&A deals, focused partnership deals and focused 
R&D have the ability to improve a research pharmaceutical company’s value while 
M&A deals, partnership deals, and R&D (here refers to all deals, no matter focused or 
not) have negative effects on company value, the next question is that how focused 
those deals need to be.  
To find the turning point that focus percentage reverse a negative effect to positive for 
M&A deals, the following equation is used.  
 
(M&A’ + Focus x M&A’) x M&A= 0, 
where M&A is the variable, and “M&A’ + Focus x M&A’” represents the coefficient 
when aggregate M&A deal effect and focused M&A deal effect are considered 
together.  
Similar equations are used for examining turning points for partnership deals and R&D.  
 
(Partnership’ + Focus x Partnership’) x Partnership = 0, 
where Partnership is the variable, and “Partnership’ + Focus x Partnership’” represents 
the coefficient when aggregate Partnership deal effect and focused Partnership deal 
effect are considered together.  
 
(R&D’ + Focus x R&D’) x R&D = 0, 
where R&D is the variable, and “R&D’ + Focus x R&D’” represents the coefficient 
when aggregate R&D deal effect and focused R&D deal effect are considered together.  
 
Based on the above calculation, focus percentage turning point for M&A deals is 
43.79%, focus percentage turning point for Partnership deal is 60.62%, and focus 
percentage turning point for R&D is 49.69%. Therefore, when a research 
pharmaceutical company acquire a target company that has more than 43.79%  overlap 
with itself, then the M&A deal can bring significant positive effect to the company. The 
same thing can be concluded with Partnership deals and R&D. When a research 
pharmaceutical company enters into a partnership to obtain a product or a technology 
that is within the company’s same core research area, the deal will affect the company’s 
value significantly at a positive direction. Finally, when more than 49.69% of R&D of a 
research pharmaceutical company is on its core research area, R&D will impose a 




However, the mean of focus percentage of the sample is 51.55%. Although the M&A 
deal turning point (43.79%) and the R&D turning point (49.69%) are low enough for 
most research pharmaceutical companies to execute, the partnership turning point 
(60.62%) is relatively high. Thus, some of the companies might not be able to enter 
partnership deals that lead to a product or technology that are more than 60.62% 
focused consistent with same core research areas.  
 
Thus, it is more realistic for research pharmaceutical companies to strategically choose 
target companies that have relatively high percentage (at least above 39,90%) of overlap 
between two companies’ core research areas or to focus more (at least 49.69%)on their 
core research areas to expand and deep understanding within that area than to have more 




CHAPTER 8. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
POTENTIALS 
This paper discovered that M&A, R&D and partnership activities that concentrate on 
focused core research area of a research pharmaceutical company can bring positive 
effects to the company’s value. However, the sample size might be expanded to include 
more companies and more deals to achieve a more profound result.  
 
Moreover, it might also be necessary to understand why research pharmaceutical 
companies arrive to the trend of pipeline expansion and conglomeration. What can be 
observed in today’s market is that although deals aim for diversification and R&D 
expanding to new areas do not give a research pharmaceutical company the opportunity 
to improve its company value, such deals and such new R&D projects are constantly 
growing. The larger the research pharmaceutical company, the higher the motivation for 
it to have more pipelines. What would be the ultimate motivation of such activities is a 
interesting topic.  
 
Furthermore, with above question being raised, this paper did not expand on how can a 
research pharmaceutical company improve its value when they are trying to obtain more 
pipelines. Since nowadays huge research pharmaceutical companies have the motivation 
to expand to research areas other than core areas to better cover the market and to 
diversify any future potential risks. By having better coverage of the market, companies 
can respond to market needs more rapidly. For example, research pharmaceutical 
companies that have more pipelines might have a higher chance to respond to the 
market needs do cure COVID19. Thus, it is meaningful to research on the topic that 
how can research pharmaceutical companies can generate positive effects through deals 




CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION 
Recent years, number of M&A deals are constantly increasing in the pharmaceutical 
industry around the world. Research pharmaceutical companies often consider to 
acquire a target company to either gain more knowledge on their core research areas or 
to gain more pipelines. The motivation behind the active and frequent M&A deals is 
that research pharmaceutical companies face the challenge to cope with high R&D cost, 
long R&D cycle and short patent life. Before a research pharmaceutical company can 
finally bring a drug to the market, the company needs to go through pre-clinical trial 
and clinical trial. This R&D project can encounter failure at any stage while cost can no 
longer be recovered. 
 
However, previous researches often reached to the conclusion that M&A deals do not 
help to improve a firm’s enterprise value and in some cases M&A deals impose a 
damage on to a firm’s enterprise value.  This observation leads this paper to wonder 
whether or not M&A is truly useless and damaging, and whether or not there exists a 
strategy that can help M&A to contribute to research pharmaceutical companies 
positively. In addition, not only M&A is the tool research pharmaceutical company use 
to shorten R&D time and reduce R&D cost, Partnership also is one of the tools. At the 
same time, although research pharmaceutical companies eager to reduce R&D cost and 
time, they cannot eliminate R&D as a whole due to the reason that R&D builds the base 
of competitiveness of a research pharmaceutical company. Therefore, this paper also 
aims to examine the impact of Partnership and R&D.  
 
If examine effects of M&A deals that aim to diversify pipelines and M&A deals that 
aim to gain a deeper understanding of core research area (hereafter refers as aggregate 
M&A deal effects), the effects appear to have no significant impact on a research 
pharmaceutical company’s value. Positive impacts can only be discovered when the 
M&A deal is a focused one, that is to say, the target company and the acquiring 
company within the M&A deal have overlap on core research areas. The same 
conclusion can be drawn for Partnership deals and R&D.  
 
Firstly, when acquiring company and target company have core research areas 
overlapped more than 43.79%, M&A deals start to have positive effects on the 
acquiring company. Secondly, when a research pharmaceutical company enters into a 
partnership with another company that overlaps more than 60.62% of its core research 
area, the research pharmaceutical company can increase its company value through 
partnership. Finally, when a research pharmaceutical company focuses its R&D on core 
research areas more than 49.69%, R&D can contribute to the improvement of a research 
pharmaceutical company’s value.  
 
Thus, if a research pharmaceutical company eagers to improve its company value by 
M&A deals, Partnership deals or R&D, the company needs to incorporate its core 
research area into those strategies to some degree. M&A deals have the least strict 
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requirement on focus percentage; thus, requires the least core research area overlapping 
level. Partnership deals, on the other hand, exist to have the most strict requirement on 
focus percentage, which means the required core research area overlapping level is the 
highest.  
 
Nowadays, it is impossible for a multinational research pharmaceutical company to only 
focus on certain areas, or to only expand its understanding on certain areas; thus, it is 
merely impossible to require those companies to significantly increase their focus 
percentage. Because of this situation, the higher the focus percentage required for a 
strategy to bring significantly positive effect, the lower the feasibility the strategy is.  
 
As a conclusion, M&A deals might be seen as the best strategy from the aspect of 
positive company value improvement with relatively low focus percentage requirement. 
This might be the reason why number and frequency of M&A are constantly growing 





Event ID Window CAR Value BHAR Value CAR t-test 
1 (-10, 10)  0.0619  
2 (-10, 10) 0.0749 0.0717 2.4764 
3 (-10, 10) 0.0092 0.0082 0.1385 
4 (-10, 10) 0.0305 0.0294 0.5943 
5 (-10, 10) 0.016 0.0154 0.301 
6 (-10, 10) 0.0048 0.0041 0.1069 
7 (-10, 10) 0.0412 0.0409 0.988 
8 (-10, 10) -0.0009 -0.0044 -0.0094 
9 (-10, 10) 0.0115 0.011 0.2261 
10 (-10, 10) 0.0299 0.0299 0.9456 
11 (-10, 10) -0.0209 -0.0209 -0.5495 
12 (-10, 10) 0.0213 0.0215 0.415 
13 (-10, 10) 0.0506 0.0508 0.7776 
14 (-10, 10) -0.0589 -0.0597 -0.7605 
15 (-10, 10) 0.0548 0.052 1.0309 
16 (-10, 10) -0.0411 -0.041 -0.5713 
17 (-10, 10) 0.0625 0.0619 1.1272 
18 (-10, 10) -0.1192 -0.1207 -2.8273 
19 (-10, 10) -0.019 -0.0207 -0.2137 
20 (-10, 10) 0.0283 0.027 0.6114 
21 (-10, 10) 0.0816 0.0855 1.3804 
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22 (-10, 10) -0.0058 -0.0061 -0.1013 
23 (-10, 10) 0.0494 0.0498 1.3646 
24 (-10, 10) 0.0264 0.0241 0.8598 
25 (-10, 10) 0.0185 0.0194 0.5686 
26 (-10, 10) -0.0043 -0.0057 -0.1251 
27 (-10, 10) -0.0354 -0.0349 -1.1036 
28 (-10, 10) 0.0404 0.038 1.2965 
29 (-10, 10) 0.0209 0.0195 0.773 
30 (-10, 10) 0.015 0.014 0.4041 
31 (-10, 10) 0.0311 0.0285 0.4189 
32 (-10, 10) 0.0082 0.007 0.2324 
33 (-10, 10) 0.0865 0.0902 2.0517 
34 (-10, 10) -0.0493 -0.0445 -0.7576 
35 (-10, 10) -0.0096 -0.0111 -0.2328 
36 (-10, 10)  -0.0013  
37 (-10, 10) 0.0403 0.0386 0.8375 
38 (-10, 10) 0.0714 0.0765 1.6401 
39 (-10, 10)  0.0246  
40 (-10, 10) -0.0118 -0.0121 -0.3259 
41 (-10, 10) -0.0488 -0.0499 -0.8385 
42 (-10, 10) -0.0063 -0.0094 -0.1058 
43 (-10, 10) -0.1768 -0.1607 -2.0632 
44 (-10, 10) 0.0079 0.0069 0.1277 
45 (-10, 10) -0.0313 -0.0316 -0.4435 
46 (-10, 10) -0.0392 -0.0411 -0.6432 
 
27 
47 (-10, 10) -0.0943 -0.0966 -1.9979 
48 (-10, 10) 0.1058 0.1107 2.1781 
49 (-10, 10) -0.0329 -0.0329 -1.0558 
50 (-10, 10) 0.0744 0.0743 1.0341 
51 (-10, 10) -0.027 -0.0254 -0.4752 
52 (-10, 10) 0.0373 0.0378 0.6672 
53 (-10, 10) -0.0176 -0.0187 -0.3048 
54 (-10, 10) -0.1085 -0.1037 -1.4891 
55 (-10, 10) -0.0436 -0.0453 -0.842 
56 (-10, 10) -0.0661 -0.0646 -1.0087 
57 (-10, 10) -0.0039 -0.007 -0.0645 
58 (-10, 10) 0.0341 0.0355 0.7368 
 
Event 
ID AR(-10) AR(-9) AR(-8) AR(-7) AR(-6) AR(-5) AR(-4) AR(-3) AR(-2) AR(-1) AR(0) AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) AR(4) AR(5) AR(6) AR(7) AR(8) AR(9) AR(10) 
1 0.0156 0.0068 0.0012 0.0165  0.0038 -0.0034 -0.0001 -0.0009 0.0001 0.0218           
2 -0.0109 0.0076 0.0128 -0.0025 -0.0055 -0.0122 -0.0021 -0.0056 0.0005 -0.0014 -0.001 0.0207 0.0124 0.0062 0.0154 0.0264 0.0084 0.0008 0.0096 -0.0104 0.0057 
3 0.0058 0.0049 -0.007 0.0051 0.0099 0.0152 0.0127 -0.0135 0.0022 -0.0053 0.0062 -0.0121 0.0008 -0.0051 0.0009 0.0065 -0.0049 -0.0146 0.0136 -0.0146 0.0025 
4 -0.0077 0.0037 0.0195 0.0008 0.0181 0.0078 0.0232 0.0021 0.0003 -0.0168 -0.0056 -0.0067 -0.006 -0.0037 0.0011 -0.0043 0.0009 0.0026 -0.0029 0.0053 -0.0012 
5 0.0036 0.0019 0.0078 -0.0043 0.001 0.0055 -0.0178 0.0087 -0.0151 0.0038 0.0034 0.003 0.0039 0.0032 -0.0069 -0.0078 0.0034 0.0065 -0.0056 0.0078 0.01 
6 0.0036 -0.0071 0.001 0.0019 -0.0037 0.0132 -0.009 -0.01 0.0026 -0.0007 -0.012 -0.0022 -0.0018 0.0081 -0.0003 0.0072 0.0094 0.0126 -0.0032 -0.0094 0.0046 
7 0.0116 0.0055 0.0093 -0.0018 0.0017 -0.0001 0.0029 0.0043 0.0126 0.0028 0.0106 -0.0001 0.0028 -0.0063 -0.0029 0.0043 0.0002 -0.0066 -0.0107 -0.007 0.0081 
8 0.0036 -0.0256 -0.002 -0.0054 -0.005 0.0146 0.0015 -0.0393 0.0071 0.0057 -0.0212 0.0611 -0.0116 -0.0059 0.0097 0.0049 -0.0156 -0.0005 -0.0008 0.0108 0.013 
9 -0.0023 0.0074 -0.0018 -0.01 -0.0043 0.0018 -0.0063 -0.0055 0.0066 0.0047 0.0044 0.0099 0.0226 -0.0135 -0.0029 -0.0096 0.003 -0.0031 0.0069 0.0021 0.0014 
10 0.008 0.0029 0.0053 -0.0014 -0.0016 0.008 0.0028 -0.001 0.0063 0.0034 0.0097 -0.0068 0.0051 0.0055 0.0087 0.002 -0.0008 -0.0051 -0.0138 -0.0038 -0.0035 
11 0.0042 -0.004 -0.002 -0.0098 0.0299 -0.0118 0.0021 0.0042 0.0005 -0.0105 0.0054 -0.0048 -0.0128 0.0016 -0.0091 -0.0107 -0.0138 0.0084 0.0078 0.0047 -0.0004 
 
28 
12 0.0164 0.0006 -0.009 0.0153 -0.005 0.0115 0.0007 -0.0062 -0.0039 -0.0055 0.0026 0.0022 -0.0053 -0.008 -0.0113 0.0075 -0.0046 0.0123 0.0004 0.0068 0.0038 
13 0.0055 -0.0026 0.0075 -0.0038 -0.0011 -0.01 0.0023 0.0032 -0.007 -0.0001 0.0222 0.0072 0.0026 -0.0054 0.0021 -0.0037 0.0028 0.0167 0.0012 0.0137 -0.0027 
14 0.0047 0.0139 -0.0042 -0.0041 -0.0167 -0.0036 -0.0214 0.002 0.0017 -0.0125 0.022 -0.0146 -0.0185 0.0146 -0.0253 -0.0237 -0.015 0.0321 0.0074 0.0049 -0.0026 
15 -0.0115 -0.0036 0.0098 -0.0101 -0.0005 0.0185 -0.0211 0.0242 -0.0102 0.0071 0.0057 -0.0038 0.0093 0.0013 0.0031 0.0278 0.0054 -0.0002 0.01 0.0074 -0.0138 
16 -0.0041 -0.006 -0.0006 0.0075 0.0037 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0167 0.0101 0.0059 -0.015 -0.0053 0.0065 -0.0123 -0.0005 -0.0055 0.001 -0.0056 0.0001 -0.0038  
17 -0.0022 -0.0135 0.0083 0.0056 -0.0079 -0.0067 -0.0108 0.0004 0.028 0.0065 -0.009 0.0128 0.0026 0.011 0.0071 0.0084 0.001 0.014 0.001 -0.0015 0.0074 
18 0.0155 -0.0028 -0.0121 0.0006 0.0008 -0.0866 -0.0069 -0.0033 -0.0046 -0.0145 -0.0112 -0.0029 -0.0051 0.0045 0.0035 -0.0028 -0.0125 0.0035 -0.0015 0.0053 0.0139 
19 -0.0063 0.0023 0.008 -0.0024 0.0142 -0.0048 0.0022  0.0141 -0.0026 -0.0081 -0.0289 0.0047 -0.007 0.0031 -0.0041 0.0017 -0.0048 0.0058 -0.008 0.0019 
20 0.0011 0.0035 0.0078 -0.0095 0.0177 -0.0078 0.02 -0.0186 -0.023 -0.0017 0.0334 -0.0024 -0.0051 0.0167 -0.0146 0.0017 -0.0108 0.0139 -0.0103 0.0159 0.0004 
21 0.0104 0.0145 -0.002 0.0032 -0.0047 0.0095 0.0178 0.0028 0.0015 -0.0012 0.0028 -0.0071 0.0101 0.0029 -0.011 0.0097 0.013 -0.0046 -0.0029 0.0062 0.0107 
22 0.0028 0.0023 0.0058 0.0074 0.0116 -0.0157 -0.0037 0.007 -0.0057 0.0007 -0.0115 -0.0062 0.0118 0.0014 -0.0124 -0.0075 -0.0075 0.003 0.003 0.0069 0.0007 
23 0.0031 0.0052 0.001 0.0072 -0.0036 0.0015 -0.0042 0.0053 0.008 -0.0045 0.0029 -0.0072 0.0203 0.0075 -0.004 0.0029 -0.0005 -0.0047 -0.002 0.008 0.0072 
24 0.0003 0.004 -0.0034 -0.0031 0.0018 -0.0028 0.0091 -0.0008 -0.0054 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0008 0.0277 0.0233 0.002 -0.0023 -0.0072 -0.0097 -0.0026 -0.0019 0.0003 
25 0.0043 -0.0023 0.0044 0.0039 -0.0027 0.0007 -0.0021 -0.0026 0.0097 0.0079 0.0097 0.0021 -0.002 -0.0051 -0.0044 -0.0016 0.0044 0.0091 -0.0102 -0.0049 0.0002 
26 0.0123 -0.0067 -0.0072 -0.0069 0.0004 -0.0068 0.0037 0.0148 -0.0065 0.0069 -0.0066 -0.0042 -0.0035 -0.0012 0.0026 0.0015 -0.0067 0.0224 0.01 -0.0152 -0.0074 
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28 -0.0053 -0.0021 0.0036 0.01 0.0015 -0.0219 0.014 0.0059 0.014 -0.0043 0.0136 0.0042 -0.0027 0.0051 0.004 0.0023 0.002  -0.0045 -0.0017 0.0027 
29 0.0039 0.005 0.009 0.0082 -0.0017 0.0029 0.0035 0.0012 -0.0014 -0.006 -0.0011 0.0007 0.0038 -0.0025 0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0064 -0.0025 -0.0054 0.0058 0.0045 
30 -0.0043 -0.0058 -0.0016 0.006 0.0031 0.0026 0.0041 -0.0011 -0.0185 0.0002 0.0067 -0.0086 0.0081 0.0066 0.0066 0.005 0.0108 -0.0041 -0.0051 0.0074 -0.0031 
31 -0.0028 0.0183 -0.0234 0.0057 -0.0199 -0.0007 0.0111 0.0239 -0.013 0.0028 -0.01 0.007 0.0046 0.0011 0.0163 0.0034 -0.0203 0.0225 0.0251 0.0062 -0.0268 
32 -0.0208 0.0052 0.0011 -0.0044 0.0037 0.0042 0.0039 0.0047 -0.0023 -0.0348 0.0119 0.0032 0.0069 0.008 0.0073 -0.0061 0.0038 0.0106 -0.0028 0.0023 0.0026 
33 0.0113 -0.0013 -0.0018 0.0066 0.0028 0.0033 0.0005 0.0091 -0.0014 0.0026 -0.0006 0.0156 0.0117 -0.0009 0.0028 0.0131 -0.0011 0.0028 0.0059 0.0014 0.0041 
34 -0.0137 -0.0021 0.0113 -0.0165 0.0025 -0.0269 -0.0312 -0.0232 0.0119 -0.006 0.0184 0.0083 -0.0038 0.0238 0.0265 0.0301 -0.0034 -0.0114 0.0094 -0.0144 -0.0389 
35 0.0092 0.0036 -0.032 0.0069 -0.0164 0.002 0.0039 -0.0006 0.012 0.0056 -0.003 0.0005 -0.0091 -0.0137 -0.0015 0.0013 0.0092 0.0065 0.0057 0.0035 -0.0032 
36 -0.0114 -0.004 0.0015 0.007 -0.0054 0.0062 0.0094 -0.0021 -0.0149 -0.0018 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0052 0.0128 -0.0034 -0.0094 0.013 0.0143 -0.0067   
 
29 
37 -0.0031 -0.0007 0.0116 0.0035 -0.0064 0.0005 0.0099 0.0023 0.0017 -0.0009 -0.0023 -0.0063 0.001 0.0006 0.0017 0.004 0.0102 0.0037 0.005 -0.0076 0.0119 
38 -0.001 -0.0063 0.0003 0.0123 -0.0011 -0.0059 0.0072 0.0079 -0.0173 0.0086 0.0158 -0.0021 0.0119 0.0054 -0.0006 0.0054 0.0048 0.0151 -0.0016 0.0012 0.0114 
39 0.0008 0.0036 -0.0077 -0.0045 -0.007 0.007 0.0097 0.0084 0.006 0.0045 0.003           
40 -0.002 -0.0024 0.0019 -0.0077 -0.005 0.0036 0.0181 -0.0086 0.0045 -0.0069 -0.004 -0.0065 0.0075 -0.0134 0.0126 -0.0037 0.0158 -0.0099 -0.0101 0.0025 0.0019 
41 0.0051 -0.013 -0.0075 -0.0002 -0.0072 -0.0034 0.0017 -0.0008 -0.003 0.002 -0.0065 -0.0132 -0.0053 -0.0104 -0.0059 -0.0044 0.0055 0.0039 0.0032 0.0108 -0.0002 
42 -0.0159 0.0196 0.0081 0.033 -0.0001 -0.0047 0.0037 -0.0078 0.009 -0.0055 -0.0209 -0.0071 -0.0164 -0.0113 0.0091 0.0179 -0.0065 -0.0178 -0.0102 -0.0232 0.0407 
43 -0.0065 -0.0314 0.0121 -0.0198 -0.0116 0.013 0.0035 0.0206 -0.0099 -0.0231 0.002 -0.0118 0.002 -0.0329 -0.0199 0.0063 -0.0455 -0.0415 0.0351 0.0032 -0.0207 
44 0.0009 0.0041 -0.004 -0.0032 0.0067 -0.0006 0.0194 0.003 0.0075 0.0024 0.0112 0.0048 0.0064 -0.0037 -0.0055 -0.0122 -0.0109 0.0042 0.0034 -0.0121 -0.0139 
45  0.0181 -0.0171 -0.0017 -0.0022 0.005 -0.0093 -0.0004 0.009 -0.0033 -0.0089 0.0135 -0.0069 -0.0045 0.0056 0.0071 -0.0088 -0.0089 0.0008 -0.0077 -0.0107 
46 0.0141 0.0011 0.0028 -0.0071 0.0011 -0.0035 0.0147 -0.0114 -0.0072 0.0029 -0.0016 -0.0038 -0.0668 0.0052 0.0113 -0.0058 0.0075 -0.0085 0.0196 -0.0038  
47 0.0002 -0.0473 0.0147 -0.0229 -0.0709 0.009 0.0127 -0.0034 -0.0107 -0.0165 0.0369 -0.0195 0.0188 -0.0002 0.0259 -0.0199 0.0164 -0.0066 -0.0126 -0.0112 0.0128 
48 0.0304 0.0085 0.0154 0.0077 -0.0015 0.0077 0.0016 0.0153 -0.0014 -0.0021 0.007 0.0054 0.0035 0.001 0.0132 0.0018 0.0065 0.0051 -0.0192 0.009 -0.0091 
49 -0.0098 -0.0022 -0.01 0.0067 0.0042 0.0119 0.0032 0.0051 -0.0264 0.0004 0.0007 0.006 -0.0013 -0.0075 0.003 -0.0002 -0.0029 -0.0045 -0.0061 -0.0049 0.0017 
50 0.0116 -0.0153 -0.0176 0.0142 0.0053 0.0142 -0.0088 -0.0128 0.0343 0.0201 0.0064 -0.0121 -0.0092 0.0087 -0.0057 -0.0092 0.0014 0.0296 -0.0074 0.0164 0.0103 
51 0.0602 0.0158 0.0084 0.0223 0.0294 -0.0425 0.0025 -0.0183 0.0133 0.0532 -0.0843 -0.0828 0.0151 0.0059 -0.0479 0.0108 -0.0337 -0.0096 0.0181 0.0222 0.0149 
52 -0.0338 -0.0248 -0.0008 0.0327 -0.0032 -0.01 0.024 0.0083 -0.0009 0.0001 -0.0007 0.004 0.0111 -0.0181 0.0029 0.0227 -0.0066 0.0052 0.0138 0.0112 0.0002 
53 -0.0114 0.016 -0.0069 0.0055 -0.0141 -0.0043 0.0069 0.0056 0.0206 0.0128 -0.0003 0.004 0.0086 -0.0155 0.0097 -0.0138 -0.027 -0.0215 -0.0018 -0.0149 0.0242 
54 0.05 0.034 -0.0011 -0.0142 -0.0235 -0.0316 -0.034 0.0143 0.0172 0.0234 -0.0118 0.0058 0.0108 0.0275 0.0146 -0.0264 -0.0843 0.0073 -0.0339 -0.0261 -0.0265 
55 -0.0308 0.0011 -0.002 0.0006 -0.0109 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0052 0.0031 -0.0065 0.0126 0.0073 0.0192 0.0128 0.0157 -0.0666 0.0079 0.0049 -0.0155 -0.01 0.0083 
56 -0.0366 -0.0048 -0.0099 0.0038 0.0036 0.003 0.005  0.0039 0.0287 0.0133 0.0034 -0.0061 -0.0266 -0.0119 -0.0113 -0.0218 -0.013 0.0328 0.0082 -0.0298 
57 0.0503 0.0078 0.0055 0.0059 -0.0204 -0.0051 -0.0024 -0.0188 0.0082 0.006 0.0134 0.0047 -0.0142 -0.0031 -0.0085 -0.0026 0.0055 -0.0166 -0.0117 -0.0072 -0.0006 
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